【赛事公告】第三十届韩素音国际翻译大赛启动
第三十届韩素音国际翻译大赛竞赛规则
从2018年起“韩素音青年翻译奖竞赛”正式更名为“韩素音国际翻译大赛”。2018年第三十届韩素音国际翻译大赛由中国翻译协会和广东外语外贸大学联合主办，《中国翻译》编辑部与广东外语外贸大学高级翻译学院联合承办。欢迎海内外广大翻译工作者和翻译爱好者参赛。参赛规则如下：
本届竞赛分别设立汉语与英语、法语、俄语、西班牙语、阿拉伯语五个语种双向互译，共计十个比赛项目，参赛者可任选一项或同时参加多项竞赛，竞赛原文请参见《中国翻译》2018年第1期夹页、“中国翻译”微信公众号或中国翻译协会网站发布的内容。
参赛者年龄：45岁以下（1973年1月1日后出生）。
参赛译文须独立完成，杜绝抄袭现象，一经发现，将取消参赛资格。请参赛者在大赛截稿之日前妥善保存参赛译文，请勿在书报刊、网络等任何媒体公布自己的参赛译文，否则将被取消参赛资格并承担由此造成的一切后果。
参赛报名流程：
关注“中国翻译”微信公众号→对话框内输入“竞赛报名”→弹出报名表→填写报名信息、选择参赛组别（英译汉、汉译英、法译汉、汉译法、俄译汉、汉译俄、阿译汉、汉译阿、西译汉、汉译西）→支付报名费（30元）→报名成功，获得参赛资格：微信收到“报名确认通知”（内含“报名凭据”）→通过电子邮箱提交参赛译文（每次报名只收到一个报名凭据，每个报名凭据只能提交一项参赛译文，如参加两项，须报名两次。）
参赛译文提交要求：
（一）请于2018年于5月31日（含）前将英译汉、汉译英参赛译文提交至hsyaward@tac-online.cn；
将法译汉、汉译法、俄译汉、汉译俄、西译汉、汉译西、阿译汉、汉译阿参赛译文提交至hsyaward2@tac-online.cn。6月1日零时之前未提交参赛译文者，视为自动放弃参赛资格，组委会不再延期接受其参赛译文。
（二）参赛译文须为WORD电子文档，中文宋体，中外文皆为小四号字，1.5倍行距。
（三）邮件主题及参赛译文文档命名格式为：参赛组别 + 姓名 + 报名凭据，如：英译汉张三1122ee8903，提交译文前请仔细核对报名凭据，确保无误。
（四）译文正文内请勿书写译者姓名、地址等任何个人信息，否则将被视为无效译文。每项参赛译文一稿有效，恕不接收修改稿。
发送参赛译文后，请勿重复发送。如需查询是否发送成功，可在2018年7月20日之后查询中国翻译协会网站（www.tac-online.org.cn）公布的所有有效参赛者的报名凭据。
竞赛设一、二、三等奖和优秀奖若干名。一、二、三等奖将获得证书、奖杯、奖金和纪念品，优秀奖将获得证书和纪念品。《中国翻译》杂志和微信公众号等将公布竞赛结果。竞赛颁奖典礼将于2018年底举行，竞赛获奖者将获邀参加颁奖典礼。
请登录中国译协网（www.tac-online.org.cn）或关注“中国翻译”微信公众号，了解本届竞赛最新动态。
联系地址：北京市西城区百万庄大街24号《中国翻译》编辑部 邮编：100037
第三十届韩素音国际翻译大赛组委会
汉译外竞赛原文：
地名中的传统文化含量
中国具有悠久的文明历史，留下了丰富多彩的历史篇章。历史有时间与空间这两个维度，直白地说，历史就是人们在一定的时间和特定空间创造的事件。时间是流动的，“逝者如斯夫，不舍昼夜”。空间却相对的固化，“人生代代无穷已，江月年年只相似。”（张若虚《春江花月夜》）。读万卷书，行万里路。书中所见是历史的时间地图；路中所见是历史的空间地理。而空间地理首先是从地名反映出来的。
年轻的时候读书，有机会到河南、陕西、山西、甘肃等地考察，每每见到《史记》、《资治通鉴》中常见的历史地名，在现实中就呈现在我走过的这条路旁的界标上，总是感慨万千，油然升起一种穿越历史时空的苍茫感。中国悠久的历史和文化仿佛就在身边，并不那么遥远。
地名是故乡的第一记忆。西晋末年，永嘉南渡，不少北方士民，被战争所驱迫，离乡背井，迁徙到遥远的南方去，他们不知道什么时候能回到故土。于是，设置了很多侨置的州县，沿用北方故土的名字。用地名保留故乡记忆是人类共同的感情。大航海之后的殖民扩张时代，欧洲人到了美洲、澳洲，给自己新的居住地，安上故乡的旧地名，这在美国、加拿大、澳大利亚，可以说是比比皆是，司空见惯。
由此想到，当下的中国，许多地名是否能很好地保留祖先的历史记忆，传导深厚的历史文化底蕴？值得我们反思。
比如说，今天许多省域的简称。安徽，境内有皖江，简称皖，自有其道理，其实安徽最深刻的记忆是徽。陕西简称陕，其实陕县在河南，陕之西并不是陕，而“秦”恰恰是陕西最深刻的记忆。又如，县级机构的设立是秦汉创建郡县制国家体制的基础要素之一。而郡县制是中国悠久历史中最具特色的制度。相反，区与市，却是很晚近的行政体制，中国历史上的市不是行政区划，现在作为行政区划的市是从日本移植过来的。可是，随着我国城市化的扩大，县改为市，成为普遍的事情，也许将来有一天，中国最古老的文化符号之一—“县”，就会逐渐消失。
人类社会发展过程中，会丢弃一些传统的文化符号，这是正常现象。但是，这种丢弃一定有某种特定原因。否则人们一定是想方设法地保存历史记忆。联合国的非物质遗产申遗，大约就是鼓励这种行为。而地名的历史文化深度和广度，甚至要超过许多被保护的物质文化遗产。
究其原因，在一段时期内，与历史和文化虚无主义有关。民国初年，北洋政府甚至禁止中医公开营业，许多中国传统的节日也被取消，包括正旦（俗称过年），代之以阳历新年。后来大约群众的习惯力量太强大，才改成了春节。现在我们都把过年叫春节。许多地名的更改，改得越没有历史味道，就显得越进步、越新潮，就跟这种思潮有关。
近几年来，国家恢复了许多传统节日，把这些传统节日定为法定假日，这是一种提倡，一种态度。过节是人的需求，一种文化和情感的需求。就像节日的问题一样，我觉得有些被历史与文化虚无主义所妄改的地名，也应该正本清源，还其历史面目。对于各地的历史地名，进行一次拨乱反正，也许正当其时。
注：根据赛事所设项目，本汉语原文可被译为英语、法语、俄语、西班牙语、阿拉伯语，参赛者可任选一项或多项。
英译汉竞赛原文：
On Inequality
In the past four decades, studies of rising inequality in the United States have typically focused on the bottom 90 percent of earners. Economists have produced rigorous evidence demonstrating how trends in technology, trade, unionization, and minimum wages have shaped the fortunes of those Americans. Global labor-market forces have pushed up the demand for highly skilled workers and have led to steadily increasing wages for those with a college education. The same forces have led to declining or stagnant wages for those with lower levels of education. And a decline in unionization rates and the fall in the real value of the minimum wage have exacerbated the downward pressures on middle- and low-wage workers.
Less well understood are the causes of the tremendous surge in income among extremely high earners, meaning the upper 1.0, 0.1, and 0.01 percent. From a policymaking point of view, the most important question is how much of the ultrarich’s income reflects activity, such as technological innovation, that benefits the broader economy. If, in contrast, the income of the biggest earners is produced by pursuits that are less broadly beneficial, such as high-frequency stock market trading, then higher taxes at the top would pose fewer economic costs.
Compared with the richest people and families in the early 1900s, when large fortunes often came from inherited assets, today’s superrich are acquiring a larger share of their income in the form of earnings. About 60 percent of the income of the top one percent in the United States today is labor income. Some economists talk about the rise of “supersalaries” or “supermanagers”: top executives of large corporations, primarily in the financial industry, who enjoy very generous compensation packages. They disagree, however, about whether the income earned by such executives reflects the efficient working of a market for talent, in which case their pay reflects their value, or whether the massive compensation packages result from a bargaining process that is shaped by regulations, institutions, and social norms.
Others highlight the role of technological developments in creating substantial economic rewards for those who possess specific skills and in reducing the employment security of less skilled workers.
Still others maintain that the primary factors driving the rise in executive pay at the top are not technology or imperfect markets but eroded social norms, questionable corporate-governance practices, and declining unionpower.
Another essential set of questions about inequality centers on whether wealth concentration negatively affects economic growth, shared prosperity, and democratic institutions. Since lower-income households have a higher propensity to spend out of their earnings than do higher-income ones, the more wealth held by high-income households, the less overall spending the economy might see. Another potential problem is that wealthy Americans tend to vote for (and lobby for) lower taxes; increased wealth concentration, then, could lead to harmful reductions in government spending on public goods such as education and infrastructure.
Even if the income of top earners reflects genuinely worthwhile contributions to society and does not impede economic growth, today’s extreme inequality does threaten social cohesion. Economists and policymakers need not worry about inequality and should instead focus on reducing poverty and expanding opportunity.
In the winner-take-all economy of the contemporary United States, the gap between the top and the bottom has grown so large that it undermines any reasonable notion of equal opportunity. As inequality has increased, the country has witnessed a fraying of communities and institutions and deepening divisions along socioeconomic lines. Children from high-income homes are pulling further and further ahead of their less advantaged peers in terms of education, which means it is far less likely that children born into middle- or low-income homes will experience upward economic mobility.
Inequality also harms American society by encouraging negative perceptions of the economy and one’s prospects for upward mobility. If Americans view the system as rigged against them and see economic success as out of reach, they might give up on the celebrated American ideals of hard work and meritocracy. Research shows that young men are more likely to drop out of high school if they live in places with higher levels of income inequality, all else being equal. This is consistent with evidence produced by psychologists showing that beliefs about inequality negatively affect people’s expectations of social mobility.
The alarmingly low rates of labor-force participation among young Americans and those of prime working age might also be driven, at least in part, by a sense of malaise shaped by today’s high levels of income inequality. Labor-force participation among American men aged 25 to 54 has fallen steadily since the mid-1960s, a trend that has been sharper in the United States than in other advanced economies.
A growing body of evidence now indicates that inequality in the United States threatens to create intergenerational poverty traps, greatly reduce social mobility, and marginalize entire swaths of the population. Such effects are sure to have political ramifications.
Many economists assume that no matter what policy remedies for extreme inequality emerge, wealthy elites will marshal their considerable influence to maintain their position and privileges. But they do not explore those potential policies at great length, nor do they consider the precise mechanisms that would shape pushback from the elites. In 2016, the Brexit vote and the American presidential election revealed the strength of populist and nationalist sentiments among voters who gleefully rejected the elite classes in both the United Kingdom and the United States.
When it comes to the problem of income and wealth inequality in the United States, there are no silver bullets. But policymakers have many levers available to them. The best evidence suggests that the United States could have a more progressive federal income tax code without incurring substantial economic costs. Tax reform should focus on expanding the tax base by closing loopholes and eliminating regressive features such as the mortgage-interest tax deduction, which benefits only high-income homeowners, and the carried-interest loophole, which benefits only those involved in private-equity finance.
The federal government should take the additional revenue such steps would generate and invest it in programs that would increase the country’s economic potential. That would include improvements to public infrastructure, expanded access to high-quality childcare and preschool programs, and more spending on programs that assist economically disadvantaged youth. Government commitments to public universities and community colleges must be strengthened. At the same time, institutions of higher education must focus on helping their students build the skills they will need to succeed in a competitive, rapidly changing labor market. These types of investments are crucial if the United States is to remain a land of opportunity.